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Quantum secure direct communication is one of the important mode of quantum communication, 
which sends secret information through a quantum channel directly without setting up a prior key. 
Over the past decade, numerous protocols have been proposed, and part of them have been 
experimentally demonstrated. However, the strict security proof is still in suspense. Two-way protocol 
is seen as one of the most practical protocol, in this paper, the security of the two-way quantum secure 
direct communication protocol will be proved against general attacks when the noisy and lossy channel 
is taken into account. There are two steps included in the proof, firstly, we need to prove that the 
mutual information between Alice and Bob is larger than the mutual information shared between Alice 
and the eavesdropper when the error rate in control mode is less than the predetermined threshold. 
Secondly, once the error rate is lower than the threshold, one can always find out a forward error 
correction code to guarantee the security of information transmission.  
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channel noise. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Quantum communication enables two remote parties to 
share secret information securely over a long distance [1]. 
Since the pioneering protocol was presented by Bennett and 
Brassard [2], different modes of quantum communication 
have been developed, such as quantum key distribution 
(QKD), quantum secret sharing, quantum secure direct 
communication (QSDC), quantum teleportation, quantum 
dense coding, and so on [2-6]. 
QSDC is one of the important mode of the quantum 
communication, in contrast to QKD, QSDC sends secret 
information directly through a quantum channel with 
unconditional security without setting up a prior key [7]. 
Since the first QSDC protocol was proposed [4], it has 
become one of the hot research topics in quantum 
communication over the past decade [8, 9]. To the 
entanglement carriers, in 2003, Deng, Long and Liu 
proposed the two-step QSDC protocol where the criteria for 
QSDC were explicitly stated [10]. QSDC protocols based 
on high-dimensional entanglement, multipartite 
entanglement, and hyperentanglement were developed [11-
14]. To the single photons carriers, the first QSDC protocol 
was proposed in Ref. [15], the so-called DL04 protocol, its 
feasibility have been demonstrated [16-18]. Wei Zhang .et 
al carried out QSDC experiment with quantum memory 
[19]. In addition, protocols of quantum signature, quantum 
dialogues, and quantum direct secret sharing have been 
constructed based on QSDC [20-22].  
In the practice, the channel loss and noise may lead to the 
error of the information bit when it is encoded on the 
individual photon [23]. Therefore, QSDC protocol uses a 
block transmission technique was proposed by Long and 
Liu, in which the quantum information carriers such as 
single photons or Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entanglement 
pairs are transmitted in a block of N particles [4]. However, 
when there is noise in the quantum channel, an adversary 
Eve can gain a certain amount of qubits by hiding her 
presence in the channel noise. The information leakage may 
be eliminated by using quantum privacy amplification [24]. 
Unfortunately, quantum privacy amplification ruins the 
direct communication picture as it involves the merger and 
order reshuffling of qubits.  
An efficient way to implement QSDC in noisy and lossy 
channel is to use classical forward error correction (FEC) 
code. Two-way protocol is seen as one of the most practical 
protocol [25-30]. In the previous work [16,31], a FEC code, 
named frequency coding scheme, was used in the two-way 
QSDC to overcome the channel loss and noise, however, 
the strict security proof of the protocol is still an 
outstanding question. In this work, we present a security 
proof of the two-way QSDC protocol against general 
attacks. There are two steps in the proof, we first prove that 
secure qubits is not zero when the error rate in control 
mode is lower than the predetermined threshold. Secondly, 
once the first condition is satisfied, one can always find out 
a FEC coding scheme which can transmit information 
securely. 
II. SECURITY OF TWO-WAY QSDC 
PROTOCOL 
Suppose that Alice wants to send secret information to 
Bob. The two-way QSDC protocol works as follows:  
(1) Bob prepares a block of Ne single photons. Each 
photon in the block is randomly in one of the four 
states |0>, |1>, |+>, and |->, where |0> > are the 
eigenstates of the Pauli Z operator, and |±>=(|0>±|1>)/2 
are the eigenstates of the Pauli X operator. Then Bob 
sends the single-photon block to Alice, Alice 
acknowledges this fact.  
(2) Because of channel noise and loss, Alice receives only 
Nr single photons (Nr=Ne·ηf), where ηf is the 
transmission efficiency of Bob-Alice channel i.e. 
forward channel. He selects CNr number (C is a 
positive number less or equal to 1/2) of photons 
randomly from the Nr received photons for 
eavesdropping check by measuring them randomly in 
the X-basis or the Z-basis (Control mode). Then Alice 
tells Bob the positions, the measuring-basis and the 
measuring results of these measured photons. Bob 
compares his results with those of Alice and obtains an 
error rate e. If the error rate is higher than the 
threshold, they will abort the communication. If the 
error rate is less than the threshold, the Bob-Alice 
communication is considered as safe, and then 
continue to the next step.  
(3) The remaining (1-C)Nr received photons are used for 
encoding secret information (Encode mode). She also 
selects C(1-C)N1 single photons from the remaining 
photons randomly as check bits for the Alice-Bob 
transmission, and applies randomly one of the two 
operations, U=iσy=|0><1|-|1><0|, and I=|0><0|+|1><1|, 
which flip or not flip the state of the photon. The rest 
of the single photons will be encoded for information 
transmission, the coding scheme is pre-negotiated and 
proper designed according to the error rate measured in 
the control mode.  
(4) Alice sends the encoded photon block back to Bob who 
can deterministically decode the qubits by using the 
same measuring basis when he prepared the single 
photon. Bob gets the bit value of each single photon in 
the block and their arrival time. Because of channel 
loss, Bob receives only N (here N=(1-C)2Nr·ηb, ηb is the 
transmission efficiency of Alice-Bob channel i.e. 
backward channel) photons in each block after 
subtracting the check photons. Alice and Bob will also 
publicly compare the results of the checking bits to 
ensure if there exists eavesdropping in the Alice-Bob 
transmission. Next, Bob decodes the secret information 
from the block of qubits. 
The security proof of the above QSDC protocol includes 
two steps, in the next section, we will show that if the error 
rate e is less than the preset threshold et, secure qubit rate 
would bigger than zero, i.e. IAB>IAE, where IAB is the mutual 
information between Alice and Bob, IAE is the mutual 
information between Alice and eavesdropper (Eve). Then, 
we will prove once IAB>IAE, Alice can always find out a 
FEC code scheme to make the information transmission 
securely.  
A. Security against general attacks 
The security analysis in this section draw on the work in 
Ref. [32-35]. At first, Bob prepares a block of qubits which 
randomly in the state |0>, |1>, |+>, |-> with the same 
probability, i.e., the qubits are prepared in a mixed state, 
ρB=(|0><0|+|1><1|+|+><+|+|-><-|)/4=(|0><0|+|1><1|) 
/2. After Alice’s encoding operation, to gain Alice’s 
information bits, Eve has to distinguish ρ0A=IρBI from 
ρ1A=UρBU in the Alice-Bob channel. Since 
ρ0A=ρ1A=(|0><0|+|1><1)/2, Eve cannot gain any 
information about Alice’s information bits if she only 
attacks the qubits after Alice’s encoding operation. Eve has 
to attack the qubits traveling on both the Bob-Alice channel 
and the Alice-Bob channel in order to gain Alice’s 
information bits. 
Eve’s most general quantum operation can be described 
by a unitary operation together with an ancilla. Eve 
performs a collective attack, i.e., UBE are the same for all 
qubits. 
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U E c E c E         
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U E c E c E             (1) 
Where cij, (i,j=0, 1, +, -) can be treated as nonnegative 
real number, and |Eij>, (i,j=0, 1, +, -) forms four pairs of 
normalized vectors. After Eve’s attack in the Bob-Alice 
channel, the joint state of the forward qubit and Eve’s 
ancilla becomes 
( )BE BBob Alice BE BEU E E U    .             (2) 
After receiving the forward qubits, in the control mode, 
Alice randomly select and measures the qubits with 
probability C for attack-detection. By publishing the 
measurement results, the error rate e of qubit could be 
obtained. In the encoding mode, Alice encode k information 
bits onto the block of N forward qubits. With probability P1 
and P0, Alice encodes information bit 1 and 0 by the 
operation I and Y, respectively. The state of the qubits and 
Eve’s ancillas becomes 
0 0 1 10 0 1 1
A AABE BE BEP P      ,        (3) 
where 
0
BE BE
Bob Alice   , 1
BE BE
Bob AliceY Y   . Then Alice 
sends the encoded qubits back to Bob. The quantum 
efficiency of the information transmission is defined as 
rs=limm→∞k/n, n is the block size of encoded pulses, k is the 
secure qubits of the block. In the asymptotic scenario, the 
secure qubit rate rs is bounded by the conditional entropy of 
information bits that Alice sends to Bob given the quantum 
information of Eve, rs=S(ρA|ρBE). After Alice’s encoding 
operation, Eve can gain some quantum information about 
Alice’s qubit from the quantum state ρBE=trAρABE that is a 
joint state of the backward qubit and her ancilla. Here, we 
assume the worst case that Eve uses the entire state ρBE to 
gain information bit, even though she may have to send part 
of the state to Bob. rs=S(ρA|ρBE)=S(ρABE)-S(ρBE), here, 
S(ρABE)=-trρABElog2ρABE, S(ρBE)=-trρBElog2ρBE. In the 
following, we should calculate the eigenvalues of ρABE and 
ρBE to get S(ρABE) and S(ρBE). According to Ref. [], the 
secure qubit rate 
0( ) ( )sr h P h   ,                             (4) 
where 2 2
1c c   , P0 is the probability that Alice encode 
information bit 0 on the qubit, and h(x)=-xlog2x-(1-x)log2(1-
x) is the binary Shannon entropy.  
For the practical quantum channels, channel loss and 
noise should be considered. Alice and Bob should estimate 
the error rate in the Bob-Alice channel, we assume that the 
error rate in the backward channel is the same as the error 
rate in the forward channel. In the asymptotic scenario, 
after verifying  
1/ 4e  ,                                       (5) 
Alice can sends the secret information against collective 
attacks with secure qubit rate 
0( ) ( ) ( )s AB AE br I I h P h h e       ,            (6) 
where ηf is the channel loss in the backward channel. IAB is 
the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and IAE is 
the mutual information between Alice and Eve. As you can 
see, the final secure qubit rate relates not only to the error 
rate but also the coding scheme and channel loss. 
B. Secure information bit rate 
In this part, we will prove that once the secret 
information transmission rate rs>0, Alice can always find a 
coding scheme to transmit information securely. Assume 
there is a binary asymmetric channel, the channel loss is η, 
and error rate is p1. When the photon is detected  
p(0|0)=1- p1, 
p(1|0)= p1, 
p(0|1)= p1, 
p(1|1)=1- p1,                                 (7) 
when the photon is lost  
p(0|0 or 1)= p(1|0 or 1)=1/2.                     (8) 
Therefore, the binary entropy can be expressed as 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
( ) (1 )[ log (1 )log(1 )]
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A
H p p p p p
p p p p
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1 1 1 1(1 )[ log (1 )log(1 )]p p p p        ,        (9) 
where p2=1/2 signify the loss of the qubit. 
An n bits sequence can be seen as a point in n-
dimensional Hilbert space, at the receiving end, it change to 
a ‘sphere’ because of channel loss and noise. The number 
of point in the ‘sphere’ is 
1 1 1 1( log (1 )log(1 ) )( )2 2
n p p p pnH p      .              (10) 
In order to decode correctly, the Hamming distance of each 
code word should be bigger than 2nH(p), in addition,  
1 1 1 1{(1 )[ log (1 )log(1 )] }( ) R R2 2 2 2 2
n p p p pnH p n n n           (11) 
That is 
0 ( ) 1 ( )R C p H p    ,                      (12) 
where R is the transmission efficiency, when R<C(p) one 
can always find a coding scheme to transmit information 
correctly according to Shannon’s noisy-channel coding 
theorem.  
Assume that k (k<n) information bits are encoded on the 
n qubits. Because of channel loss and noise, part of qubits 
can be leaked to Eve as we discussed above. Therefore, Eve 
can be seen as a receiver whose loss rate is ηE, which means 
Eve gains n(1-ηE) qubits, here the loss rate is originated 
from the uncertainty principle and control mode. The loss 
rate of legitimate receiver Bob is ηB, which is caused by 
channel loss and imperfect detection efficiency. 
The error code is caused by channel noise and imperfect 
encoding operation of Alice, to consider the worst case, 
Eve use a perfect channel without noise and loss. The error 
rate caused by the channel loss and Alice’s encoding 
operation is pc and pA respectively.  
The code word is expanded to a Hamming sphere 
because of the channel loss and noise. The number of 
typical code words of Eve is 
{(1 )[ log (1 )log(1 )] }
2 E A A A A E
n p p p p      
.                 (13) 
The number of typical code words of Bob is 
1 1 1 1{(1 )[ log (1 ) log(1 )] }2 A A
n p p p p      
,                (14) 
where p1=pc+pA. 
The Hamming distance of each typical code word that 
Alice used must bigger than the radius of the Hamming 
sphere. If the Hamming distance of the detected code word 
and the typical code word is bigger than the radius of the 
Hamming sphere, error would be happened. The following 
two condition must be satisfied 
1 1 1 1{(1 )[ log (1 )log(1 )] } R2 2 2B B
n p p p p n n        ,             (15a) 
1 1 1 1
{(1 )[ log (1 ) log(1 )] }
2
{(1 )[ log (1 ) log(1 )] }
2
2
2
E A A A A E
B B
n p p p p
n p p p p
 
 
     
     
 .               (15b) 
The condition (15a) keep the information transmission 
accurately, the condition (15b) assure the security of 
information transmission. 
When the radius of Eve’s Hamming sphere is three times 
of Bob’s, Eve can’t distinguish adjacent typical code words, 
here the adjacent typical code words means the typical code 
words which has closest Hamming distance. Although, the 
maximum transmission capacity is nR, to guarantee the 
security of information transmission, only one information 
bit could be encoded on the block, and the information bit 
should be encoded on the adjacent typical code words. With 
the increase of the radius of Eve’s Hamming sphere, more 
information bits could be encoded on the block. The final 
information transmission efficiency is 
1 1 1 1
(1 )[ log (1 ) log(1 )]
(1 )[ log (1 ) log(1 )]
2
log[ ]
2
E A A A A E
B B
p p p p
p p p p
r
 
 
     
     
  
1 1 1 1
{(1 )[ log (1 )log(1 )] }
{(1 )[ log (1 )log(1 )] }
E A A A A E
B B
p p p p
p p p p
 
 
      
      
.        (16) 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of information transmission 
efficiency changes with ηE and ηB. Only when ηE>ηB, the 
secure encoding efficiency may bigger than zero. The  
 FIG. 1. The The red dash line indicates the boundary of secure and 
unsecure area, with the increase of ηE, the secure transmission rate 
increases, however, the maximum transmission rate is always 
smaller than one, this is because of channel noise, in this 
calculation we set pA=0.01, pc=0.03. 
 
highest efficiency appears when ηE=1 and ηB=0. When 
ηB<1, the security of information transmission is guaranteed 
at the expense of encoding efficiency. This process is 
similar to the privacy amplification in the QKD, in which 
more qubit Eve obtained, less secure qubits can be left. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the security of the two-way QSDC protocol 
is proved against general attacks. The proof included two 
steps: firstly, we proved that when the system noise is lower 
than the preset threshold, the mutual information between 
Alice and Bob is larger than the mutual information shared 
between Alice and the eavesdropper. Secondly, once the 
first step is in the affirmative, one can always find a proper 
FEC to make the information transmission securely. Our 
work may be extended to other QSDC protocols, such as 
two-step protocol, multi-step protocol, high-dimension 
protocol, and so on. 
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